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The People versus the Octopus:
California Progressives and the
Origins of Direct Democracy
Le peuple contre la Pieuvre : les progressistes californiens et les origines de la
démocratie directe
Glen Gendzel
1 Direct democracy is an old idea that has come a long way from its origins in ancient
Greece. In the United States, direct democracy is a political artifact of the Progressive
Era  left  over  from  the  early  twentieth  century.  Almost  every  state  with  direct
democracy adopted it at that time; none adopted it before 1898 and very few have since
1920.1 Direct  democracy in the United States  is  also a  regional  phenomenon of  the
American West. About half of the fifty states have direct democracy, but 80% of them
are in the West.2 And of course, no state has made more use of direct democracy, for
good or ill, than has California, the big western tail that wags the American dog when it
comes  to  direct  democracy  and  just  about  everything  else.  In  recent  years  it  has
become fashionable among media pundits to blame direct democracy for California’s
political  paralysis  and  financial  basket-case  status.3 So  how  did  California  become
America’s  poster  child  for  reform  gone  awry  and  for  good  intentions  leading  to
catastrophic unintended consequences ? 
2 The story of how direct democracy turned California into a political train wreck begins,
appropriately  enough,  with  a  railroad.  Californians  had  high  hopes  for  the
transcontinental railroad project,  completed in 1869 with generous public subsidies.
The railroad was supposed to usher in a new era of rapid growth and prosperity for
California. By connecting the state more closely to the rest of the United States, the
railroad could bring people out west, while carrying the products of California’s farms
and  factories  back  east.4 Most  Californians  imagined  that  the  railroad  would  be  a
simple, benign technology, but in fact it was a monopoly corporation, known as the
Central Pacific Railroad, which soon enjoyed near-total control over all transportation
into, out of, and within the state – and this corporation was anything but benign. Some
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historians  praise  the  railroad  for  its  contributions  to  California’s  growth  and
development;  it  certainly  did  represent  a  drastic  improvement  in  transportation
efficiency over the days of covered wagons, stagecoaches, and sailing ships.5 
3 No one suggests that the railroad on balance was bad for California,  given that the
state’s  agriculture,  industry,  and  commerce  all  depended  on  it.  The  railroad  was
California’s  biggest  employer  and  biggest  private  landowner;  it  promoted  local
products and lured hordes of tourists and settlers to the state as well. The problem with
the railroad was that it insisted on controlling California’s growth and development for
its own benefit while reaping an unfair share of the profits.6 In the late nineteenth and
early  twentieth  centuries,  California  suffered  from  some  of  the  highest,  most
complicated,  and least  predictable railroad rates in the world.  Charges for carrying
passengers  and freight  varied  capriciously  between different  destinations,  different
customers, and for different cargoes; rates also changed constantly, rising and falling
not with actual railroad costs but with the market price of products being transported.
The railroad, not the producer, grabbed most of the profit to be earned by shipping
products from one place to another. As a result, California’s farmers, merchants, and
manufacturers  often  found  themselves  priced  out  of  national  markets  due  to
transportation  costs.7 And  the  railroad  routinely  blackmailed  California  towns  and
cities  into  handing  over  taxpayer  subsidies  and  land  grants  in  exchange  for  the
privilege of a rail connection. Charles Crocker, co-owner of the Central Pacific, told the
Los Angeles City Council in 1872 that if they did not pay the ransom he demanded, “I
will make the grass grow in the streets of your city.”8 Nowadays large employers and
professional sports teams play this hardball game of corporate blackmail, but western
railroads  such as  the  Central  Pacific  invented the  technique in  the  late  nineteenth
century. In 1882, the Central Pacific changed its name to the Southern Pacific after a
complex merger, but it was the same railroad company with the same monopoly power
– and with increasing political power as well. 
4 California  adopted  a  new  constitution  in  1879  to  start regulating  and  taxing  the
railroad, and this seems to have spurred the company into politics.9 Railroad lobbyists
and  attorneys  dispensed  a  torrent  of  bribes  and  favors  to  “influence”  California
legislators,  officials,  judges,  and  newspaper  editors  in  exchange  for  favorable
legislation, regulations, rulings, and press coverage. Behind the scenes, agents of the
Southern  Pacific  controlled  party  conventions,  legislative  sessions,  court  hearings,
regulatory decisions,  and even the outcomes of  elections.10 Corruption in California
politics was like wind or gravity: people couldn’t see it directly, but they could observe
its effects in the form of relentlessly pro-railroad public policy, year after year. Periodic
upsurges of reform failed to bring the Southern Pacific to heel; the company went on
charging high rates, paying low taxes, blackmailing communities, monopolizing land,
and paying off politicians while soaking up subsidies and tax breaks.11 California was
not unique in this regard: many western states in the late nineteenth century suffered
from the twin evils of corporate domination and political corruption. But California was
exceptional  in  the  extent  to  which  it  was  dominated  by  a  single  corporation:  the
Southern Pacific Railroad, locally known as “The Octopus.” 
5 Long before Frank Norris’ novel by that name appeared in 1901, California cartoonists
were  depicting  the  railroad  as  a  monster  Octopus  with  tentacles  of  steel  wrapped
around farmers,  workers,  merchants,  and manufacturers,  squeezing the lifeblood of
commerce  out  of  them.12 After  1900,  Californians  watched  with  envy  as  self-styled
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“progressives” gained power in other states and brought their corporate adversaries to
heel, notably in Wisconsin under Governor Robert La Follette. Why not in California,
too?  Anti-railroad reformers  in  California  did  wage  several  campaigns  through the
Populist party and the Democratic party without success in the 1890s and 1900s, but the
breakthrough came in 1910, when progressives seized control of the state’s Republican
party.13 They  nominated  Hiram  Johnson,  a  fiery  anti-railroad  attorney,  to  run  for
governor that year. Johnson had distinguished himself as lead prosecutor in the San
Francisco graft trials of 1906 to 1909, when he put San Francisco’s corrupt political boss
behind bars. Hence there was reason to believe that when Johnson vowed to “kick the
railroad out of politics,” he meant it. Johnson and his fellow progressive Republicans
swept the state elections of 1910, and when the next state legislature gathered in 1911,
reformers  had  control  at  last.14 They  did  not,  however,  presume that  their  victory
would be permanent. Governor Johnson and his comrades expected that the Octopus
would recover from its temporary setback and somehow outmaneuver them in the next
election.  This  is  why  California  progressives  acted  so  boldly  after  their  smashing
victory in 1910, because they figured they might have only one chance to tame the
Octopus. 
6 The 1911 session of the California legislature ranks as the single most important session
ever held in the history of the state. Besides passing landmark legislation to regulate
the railroad, and other major reforms of state government, the progressives also acted
to permanently increase the power of California voters.15 Governor Johnson and his
fellow progressives believed that more democracy was the best way to prevent a return
of  political  corruption  and  corporate  rule  in  the  future.  Confident  in  the  people’s
wisdom, the progressives assumed that more power in the people’s hands would mean
less power for the Southern Pacific or any other wealthy interest that might try to
dominate  state  government  in  the  future.16 As  a  sign  of  their  trust  in  voters,  the
progressives quickly approved woman suffrage, and California would become the sixth
state in the nation, by far the largest yet, to let women vote.17 But woman suffrage,
which  practically  doubled  the  size  of  the  electorate  overnight,  was  not  the  only
technique that the progressives had in mind for increasing democracy. As Governor
Johnson said in his 1911 inaugural address:
“How best can we arm the people to protect themselves hereafter? . . . We can give
to the people the means by which they may accomplish such other reforms as they
desire,  [and]  the means  as  well  by  which  they  may  prevent  the  misuse  of  the
power. . . .The  first  step  in  our  design  to  preserve  and  perpetuate  popular
government  shall  be  the  adoption  of  the  initiative,  the  referendum,  and  the
recall.”18
7 By 1911, California progressives were already familiar with these basic mechanisms of
direct democracy. Progressive reformers across the American West were taking up the
initiative,  the  referendum,  and  the  recall  as  promising  solutions  to  problems  of
corruption and corporate  influence in  politics.  Starting with South Dakota in  1898,
eight  western  states  had  recently  adopted  direct  democracy,  including  California’s
neighboring state of Oregon in 1902. Progressives in Oregon used direct democracy to
enact sweeping electoral reforms, and there was hope that California might follow suit
– especially  since  several  California  cities  and  towns  had  already  adopted  direct
democracy  on  the  local  level  and  had  even  begun  using  it.19 California’s  leading
advocate for direct democracy was Dr. John Randolph Haynes, a wealthy physician and
real estate investor in Los Angeles who developed a strong interest in this particular
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reform. Dr. Haynes founded the Direct Legislation League in 1900 and for decades he
devoted his time and his sizeable fortune to lobbying and publicity on behalf of direct
democracy.20 Haynes helped convince many progressives, including Governor Johnson,
that  direct  democracy  was  the  best  insurance  policy  against  future  corruption.  As
Haynes explained:
“Even the election of good men to office . . . frequently fails to produce any marked
effect because these men often . . . fail to preserve their integrity. . . . The remedy is
a plain and simple one. . . . Give the honest majority . . . the power to initiate and
enact legislation which their legislative bodies . . . may refuse; this is the initiative.
Give  to  the  honest  majority  the  power  to  veto  the  undesired  acts  of  their
legislature; this is the referendum. Give to the same honest majority the power to
discharge  from  office  at  any  time  the  inefficient  and  incompetent  . . .  public
servant; this is the recall.”21
8 Although  he  never  ran  for  office  himself,  Dr.  Haynes  was  a  savvy  politician.  He
remained non-partisan while soliciting endorsements from labor and reform groups
and extracting pledges of support from candidates in both parties. Governor Johnson
let Dr. Haynes help draft the direct democracy amendments to the state constitution,
which  the  legislature  approved  in  1911.22 Californians  were  already  accustomed  to
voting on constitutional amendments passed by the legislature; but the initiative, the
referendum,  and  the  recall  would  give  them  the  power  to  legislate  directly  for
themselves.23 This power of direct democracy, and its frequent exercise, would become
the most distinctive feature of California politics – for better or for worse. The initiative
allows registered voters in California to sign petitions in order to place laws on the
ballot  for  approval  or  rejection  by  the  electorate.  Anyone  who  can  get  enough
signatures – a number equal to 8 % of the total number of ballots cast for governor in
the  last  election –  can  place  any  law  on  the  ballot  at  the  next  state  election  as  a
numbered “proposition.” If a majority votes “yes” on the proposition, then it becomes
law, even though the legislature never approved it and the governor never signed it.
The  initiative  process  can  be  used  for  regular  statutes  (with  a  lower  signature
requirement)  or  for  constitutional  amendments,  but  it  is  almost  always  used  for
amendments  because  initiative  sponsors  hope  this  will  render  their  laws  more
impervious  to  court  challenges.  Initiatives  themselves  are  immune  to  amendment
except  through another  initiative.  California’s  all-powerful  initiative,  not  subject  to
legislative amendment or approval,  is  proof  that  the progressives wanted voters to
have supreme authority to pass their own laws irrespective of politicians and parties,
which  the  progressives  considered  suspect  and  prone  to  corruption  anyway.  The
Southern Pacific and other wealthy interests might be able to bribe delegates to party
conventions and members of the legislature, but they could never bribe a majority of
the  voters.  Hence  the  initiative  appealed  to  progressives  as  a  bulwark  against  the
return of corrupt politics. As Johnson said in his inaugural address, the initiative would
“place in the hands of the people the means by which they may protect themselves.”24
9 The  second  form  of  direct  democracy  in California  is  the  referendum.  Once  the
legislature passes a law, anyone who gathers enough signatures of registered voters – a
number  equal  to  5 %  of  the  total  number  of  ballots  cast  for  governor  in  the  last
election – can suspend implementation of the law, place it on the ballot at the next
state election, and give voters a chance to repeal the law. The referendum is essentially
the initiative in reverse: the legislature has already passed a law, and the governor has
signed it, but the voters can repeal it with a referendum. Progressives believed that this
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would  provide  another  method  for  voters  to  overrule  corrupt  politicians  in  the
legislature and reassert the will  of  the people in defiance of  wealthy interests.  The
referendum,  like  the  initiative,  was  supposed  to  help  California  voters  protect
themselves against any future return of corporate influence in politics.25 
10 The third form of California’s direct democracy system, the recall, is the one least often
used, and yet it attracted worldwide attention in 2003, when California voters recalled
their governor and replaced him with a Hollywood movie star.26 In a recall, anyone who
thinks an elected state official is unsatisfactory for any reason, or for no reason, can try
to gather enough signatures from registered voters – a number equal to 12 % of the
number of ballots cast for that official’s office in the last election – and in this way give
the voters  a  chance to  remove the official  from office.  Even if  an officeholder  was
elected fair and square, if enough voters later find that person unacceptable, they can
“throw the rascal out.” A recall election is actually two elections at once: voters get to
vote yes or no on the recall, and at the same time vote for a replacement if the recall is
successful. The recall was another electoral weapon that California progressives wanted
voters to have in their arsenal for future use. If politicians were frequently dishonest,
at least the voters were not, so the assumption was that empowering voters to remove
politicians who had betrayed the people’s trust would deter such malfeasance in office
even after the progressives themselves had passed from the scene.27 Opponents of the
progressives  protested that  with direct  democracy,  the “ignorance and caprice  and
irresponsibility of the multitude” would reign supreme and it would “play merry hell
with the business and prosperity of the state.”28 Critics focused their attacks on how the
recall would affect the judiciary. Giving voters the power to recall judges would upset
the constitutional balance of powers, endanger property rights, and undermine judicial
independence, the critics charged. Such arguments held little sway, however. Speaking
for all progressives, Governor Johnson declared “our deep-rooted belief . . . not only in
the right of the people to govern, but in their ability to govern,” which was difficult to
argue against. Johnson defended the recall by asserting that “if the people have the
right, the ability, and the intelligence to elect, they have as well the right, ability, and
intelligence to reject or to recall.” He dismissed concerns about intimidated judges this
way: “You can’t make a coward of a man by holding a pistol at his head; you can only
demonstrate whether he is one.”29
11 In  October  1911,  California  voters  approved  the  initiative,  referendum,  and  recall
amendments by a three-to-one margin. They also approved women’s suffrage, railroad
regulation, workmen’s compensation, and a raft of other progressive reforms in the
same election. No less than twenty-two amendments to the state constitution passed all
at  once,  revolutionizing  California  government  overnight  and  thrusting  Governor
Johnson into the national limelight as a progressive champion.30 A year later, when ex-
president  Theodore  Roosevelt  ran  for  president  again  as  candidate  of  the  new
Progressive party in 1912, he praised California’s reform accomplishments and chose
Johnson as his running mate. Roosevelt and Johnson lost the 1912 election, but the
legacy of direct democracy that Johnson and the progressives bequeathed to California
has remained in place ever since with only slight changes along the way.31 
12 Conservatives  predicted  that  disaster  would  ensue  from  the  passage  of  “freak
legislation” in California. Business was expected to flee the state, investors to pull out
their  funds,  and home-seekers  to  look elsewhere.  In  fact,  however,  the  progressive
revolution of 1911 ushered in two decades of rapid growth and prosperity such as the
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state had not seen since the Gold Rush. Dire warnings that direct democracy would lead
to  rule  by  tyrannical  majorities  goaded  on  by  demagogues  never  came  true.
Nonetheless, there were some early indications that direct democracy might not serve
the  ends  that  Governor  Johnson  and  the  progressives  originally  had  in  mind.  For
example, the first successful state recall elections in 1913 and 1914, using this tool of
progressive  politics,  removed  two  progressive  legislators  from office.  One  of  them,
State  Senator  Edwin  Grant  of  San  Francisco,  had  voted  for  anti-liquor  and  anti-
prostitution  bills,  which  prompted  saloon  and  brothel  owners  to  seek  revenge  by
gathering signatures, some of them forged, and mounting a successful recall against
him.32 In 1915, the first statewide referendum, using another progressive electoral tool,
repealed a key progressive law, backed by Governor Johnson, which would have made
all  state  elections  non-partisan.  The  legislature  had  approved  Johnson’s  plan,  but
outraged party leaders gathered signatures and forced a referendum on non-partisan
state elections – which the voters rejected. The progressive legislature then passed an
open primary law, which would at least encourage non-partisanship, but state party
leaders forced another referendum on this law in 1916, and the voters rejected it, too.33
These early uses of the recall and the referendum – to expel progressive legislators and
to repeal progressive electoral reforms – did not bode well for progressive hopes for
direct democracy.
13 The initiative also yielded some unintended consequences in its early years. A variety
of minor matters were placed on the ballot by fringe groups interested in them, but the
most controversial initiatives pertained to taxes and alcohol.  Advocates of a “single
tax” on land values to replace all  other taxes sponsored a string of  initiatives that
cluttered state ballots for years. None of the measures passed, but progressives were
displeased that the “single tax,” which most of them opposed, made its way onto the
ballot no less than six times between 1912 and 1938. Opponents of direct democracy
even  began  calling  themselves  “anti-single  taxers”  in  order  to  gain  support  for
curtailing the initiative process itself.34 Like single-taxers, California’s prohibitionists
also pounced on the initiative to force votes on a number of anti-liquor laws. Most
California progressives outside of the state’s southern half  were not prohibitionists,
and yet thanks to the initiative process, anti-liquor measures repeatedly cropped up on
the  ballot  – going  down  to  defeat  every  time.  Some  voters  grumbled  over  the
proliferation of  propositions in  November 1914,  when an all-time record seventeen
initiatives appeared on a single ballot, but the measures were all fairly minor and most
of them failed anyway. This was typical of the early years of the initiative: fewer than
one in three initiatives passed before 1920, and about a quarter of voters participating
in any given election refused even to vote on the propositions.35 Already in this period,
paid signature gatherers for initiative campaigns were a cause of complaint. As the San
Francisco Chronicle editorialized in 1917: 
“The abuses of direct legislation are the result of paid solicitation. When the people
really wish to stop these abuses they will make paid solicitation a penal offense. It
will probably require a little more time . . . to produce that result.” 
14 Ninety-five years later, we are still waiting; most initiative sponsors make use of paid
signature-gatherers to help qualify their measures for the ballot.36 
15 In the 1920s, the total number of ballot initiatives in California began to rise, but the
proportion that passed remained below one in three. Anti-liquor initiatives continued
appearing on the ballot even after the onset of federal prohibition in 1919. California
voters voiced their displeasure with the federal law by using a referendum to reject
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state enforcement of prohibition in 1920, but curiously, they reversed themselves two
years  later  – the only  time California  voters  ever  approved an anti-liquor measure.
Eventually, Californians changed their minds again: in 1932, the voters repealed the
state  prohibition  enforcement  law  at  the  behest  of  grape  growers,  bottle
manufacturers, and hotel owners who supplied funds for a successful initiative against
it. Thereafter California voters returned to their usual pattern of rejecting every anti-
liquor measure that came before them. The last was a “local option” initiative in 1948
that  was  rejected  by  a  70 %  majority.37 Other  high-profile  initiatives  of  the  1920s
included a strengthened ban on land ownership by Asian immigrants that was backed
by  large  farmers,  and  a  referendum  sponsored  by  margarine  producers  that
successfully  repealed  taxes  and  marketing  restrictions  on  their  product.  Dairy
companies in the butter business spent heavily against this referendum, but margarine
companies calling themselves the “Anti-Food Tax Association” spent more than twice
as  much and prevailed.  Business  interests  were  already learning how to  use  direct
democracy for their own self-interested purposes.38 
16 In 1926, California voters approved a legislative reapportionment initiative backed by
rural interests that severely reduced representation for the state’s burgeoning cities,
creating one of the most unfairly apportioned legislatures in the nation. This was an
early  indication  that  direct  democracy  could  have  profoundly  undemocratic
consequences.39 Progressives  also  learned  in  the  1920s  that  contrary  to  their
expectations, big business had little to fear from direct democracy. On three occasions,
California  voters  rejected  initiatives  that  would  have  created  a  state-owned
hydroelectric power authority to compete with privately owned power companies. All
of  the  leading California  progressives,  including Johnson and Haynes,  backed these
public power initiatives, but private power companies spent over half a million dollars
against  them, and they were all  defeated by wide margins.40 The ability of  wealthy
corporations such as Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison to spend
lavishly on advertising and publicity in order to defeat progressive initiatives showed
that direct democracy might not always work to protect “The People” against “The
Interests,” given the pronounced imbalance of financial resources between the two. In
1923, a special committee of the California legislature investigated the role of private
power companies in defeating the public power initiatives. The legislators concluded
that in direct democracy elections, “Victory is on the side of the biggest purse.” They
bemoaned “the power of money in influencing public opinion, [and] its ability to carry
popular elections through vast  expenditures for propaganda,  advertising,  literature,
and organized campaign workers.”41 
17 The anti-public power campaigns of the 1920s started the trend toward growing usage
of direct democracy by the very sorts of wealthy interests that it was supposed to hold
in check. The next phase in the gradual diversion of direct democracy away from its
democratic  intentions  came  in the  1930s,  with  the  rise  of  California’s  so-called
“initiative industry.” This is a California shorthand expression for political campaign
consultants who can gather signatures to qualify virtually any ballot measure and who
can craft advertising and mass mailings to get the measure passed – for a very high fee.
By relying on such campaign consultants, large corporations with ample funds – money
that once might have been spent on lobbying and campaign contributions – can bypass
the  politicians  in  the  legislature  and  translate  their  economic  clout  directly  into
political  outcomes.  Investing  in  direct  democracy  does  not  always  pay  off,  but
apparently wealthy interests with ample funds are always willing to give it a try. This
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pattern became clear in the 1930s, when corporations and trade associations relying on
the “initiative industry” began spending millions of dollars to gather signatures, buy
advertising,  and  send  out  mass  mailings  in  order  to  promote  ballot  measures  that
might increase their profits – or to defeat ballot measures that threatened to reduce
their profits. Either way, the rise of the “initiative industry” and the commercialization
of direct democracy was definitely not what the progressives had in mind.42 
18 The first  California consulting firm to specialize in direct  democracy campaigns on
behalf of wealthy interests was the husband and wife team of Whitaker and Baxter, also
known  as  “Campaigns,  Inc.”43 Their  clients  were  usually  corporations,  trade
associations,  and  other  business  groups  impressed  by  Whitaker  and  Baxter’s
devastatingly  successful  campaign  against  Upton  Sinclair,  the  radical  socialist
Democratic  candidate  for  governor  in  1934.  California’s  biggest  banks,  utilities,
newspapers, radio stations, and movie studios spent at least a million dollars to defeat
Sinclair in what some historians consider “the birth of media politics” with a decidedly
negative tinge.44 Two years later, national retailers led by Woolworth’s and Safeway
hired Whitaker and Baxter to craft a successful referendum that repealed a statewide
tax on chain stores. It was the first million-dollar direct democracy campaign, funded
by big national corporations, and it struck a blow against small local retailers, whom
legislators had tried to protect with the chain store tax.45 Also in 1936, California voters
were  offered  a  chance  to  repeal  the  state  income  tax  and  to  require  a  two-thirds
majority  vote  for  any  future  income  tax,  but  this  initiative  lost.  The  attempt  to
constrain the state’s power to tax the wealthy foreshadowed many laterinitiatives, but
California voters did not fall for it in the depths of the Great Depression.46 In 1938, they
rejected a pair of hard-fought initiatives that drew heavy spending on both sides. One
measure would have severely restricted labor union activities in California,  and the
other,  known  as  “Ham  and  Eggs,”  would  have  created  a  state  pension  for  elderly
residents. Business groups tried to pass the anti-labor initiative and defeat “Ham and
Eggs,” but they were only half successful: both measures lost. This was an early sign
that heavy spending in direct democracy elections is most effective on the negative
side. “Ham and Eggs” pension proposals made it onto California ballots for a few more
years, but business opposition helped to defeat or neutralize them all.47 It was at this
point in 1939 that the first comprehensive study of California’s initiative process by
political scientists appeared, with this startling conclusion:
“The history of direct legislation shows a marked change in the character of the
groups utilizing the initiative.  It  appears that now well-financed interest-groups
initiate measures more frequently than do . . . reform groups. . . .Initiative measures
do not originate with ‘The People.’ The moving forces in politics are relatively small
groups of men animated by some ‘interest’. . . to promote legislation of value . . . to
their group.”48
19 Direct democracy was supposed to help the “People” against the “Interests”; instead, it
usually worked the other way around. However, this dispiriting trend slowed down in
the next  few decades,  as  the overall  use of  direct  democracy declined.  Californians
voted on thirty-two initiatives in the 1930s, but only twenty in the 1940s, twelve in the
1950s, and just nine in the 1960s. Not a single referendum qualified for the ballot for
thirty years after 1952. Probably the main reason for the decline of direct democracy in
these years was California’s exploding population, which caused the total number of
ballots  cast  in  each  election  to  soar  into  the  millions,  jacking  up  the  threshold  of
signatures required to place measures on the ballot. There were also new restrictions
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on the gathering of signatures: direct democracy petitions originally could circulate for
unlimited periods of time, but this was reduced to two years in 1943, and then to just
150 days in 1973.49 A key ruling by the state Supreme Court, McFadden v. Jordan (1948),
banned  initiatives  that  qualified  as  constitutional  “revisions”  rather  than  a
constitutional “amendments.” Ever since 1948, the McFadden rule has banned the use of
initiatives for sweeping, fundamental changes of the California constitution that would
normally require a constitutional convention or action by the legislature. Initiatives
can only be used to amend, not revise, the constitution – and only courts can tell the
difference.  Also since 1948,  any initiative must restrict  itself  to a single subject;  no
initiative is allowed to lump together a bundle of omnibus reforms in a single package.
This rule, too, is subject to judicial interpretation and frequently requires litigation.50 
20 Despite the declining use of  direct  democracy in the postwar era,  wealthy business
interests in California continued to rely on it. In 1956, oil companies spent millions on
an initiative that would have loosened state regulation of their industry, but it  was
called the  “Oil  and Gas  Conservation Act,”  which seemed to  confuse  voters,  so  the
measure failed.51 In 1964, California landlords, realtors, and real estate investors spent
even more heavily on an initiative that would allow racial discrimination in housing.
The measure was denounced as clearly racist by liberals and civil rights groups, but
they never stood a chance against the real estate industry juggernaut that outspent
them  nearly  ten  to  one.  Courts  ultimately  struck  down  this  initiative  despite  its
popularity with California’s white majority, most of whom had voted to protect their
right to practice racial discrimination.52 Thereafter a variety of tax limitation measures
of the sort that would later become familiar appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
but all of them were rejected. Business groups were divided on these measures because
they seemed to invite fiscal  chaos;  apparently,  this  was not yet  seen as a desirable
condition to  inflict  on California  state  government.53 Environmentalist  groups  were
able to pass some initiatives in the 1970s to protect California’s incomparable heritage
of  natural  beauty from pollution and development,  but  business  interests  thwarted
several more such measures by spending heavily against them. For example, in 1976,
anti-nuclear activists placed an initiative on the ballot that would have banned nuclear
power plants in California. In response, the nuclear power industry spent millions to
convince  California  voters  that  nuclear  power  was  perfectly  safe.  The  anti-nuclear
initiative went down to defeat – but less than two years later,  after the Three Mile
Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania, some Californians may have wished to change
their votes.54 
21 The evolution of direct democracy from a progressive standby into a tool of wealthy
interests culminated in Proposition 13 in 1978. This measure was packaged and sold to
California voters as tax relief for average homeowners, when it fact it mostly benefited
big landlords and investors in commercial real estate who put up the money behind it.55
Observers  of  California  politics  recognize  that  direct  democracy  has  changed
significantly  following  Proposition  13.  The  number  of  ballot  initiatives  has  risen
sharply since the late 1970s – and so has the amount of money spent on campaigns.
Wealthy special interests ranging from casino owners and lottery consultants to the
insurance and tobacco industries  have willingly invested millions in initiatives that
promise to deliver billions in profits. The gamble does not always pay off: studies of
direct democracy show that the side spending the most money in the election does not
always win – but it usually does. Heavy spending is especially effective on the negative
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side  which  can  neutralize  those  rare  few  progressive-style  measures  on  behalf  of
workers,  consumers,  small  business,  minorities,  or  the  environment  that  do
occasionally  make  it  onto  the  ballot.56 Campaign  spending  for  and  against  ballot
propositions is loosely regulated by the California Political Reform Act of 1974, which
originally tried to limit such spending – but those limits were removed just two years
later,  following  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  decision  in  Buckley  v.  Valeo  (1976)  which
equated campaign spending with free speech. Money raised and spent in California to
support or oppose ballot propositions has to be reported, but it has no limits, and in
any case the final report of campaign expenditures does not appear until a month after
the election, which deprives voters of access to this information until it is too late to
matter.  Spending  on  direct  democracy  campaigns  in  recent  years  has  sometimes
topped tens of millions of dollars per proposition and is rising fast.57
22 Unlimited campaign spending on direct democracy, combined with the high cost of
gathering the hundreds of thousands of signatures now needed to qualify measures for
the ballot, virtually guarantees that only well-funded interests are able to sponsor such
measures  – or  block  those  they  oppose.  Hence  California’s  progressive  heritage  of
direct democracy has fallen prey to what scholars now call the “populist paradox”: a
reform that  was  supposed to  help  the  people  reduce  the  power  of  wealthy  special
interests is now a tool of those interests, which they use for distinctly un-progressive
purposes.58 Perhaps part  of  the problem is  the failure of  Governor Johnson and his
comrades back in 1911 to foresee the rise of electronic mass media, which has enabled
wealthy interests to exert more influence on public opinion than the progressives ever
could  have  imagined  by  blanketing  the  airwaves  with  clever,  often  deceptive
advertising that is expensive to produce and even more expensive to disseminate. This
is  how  direct  democracy  enables  those  with  enough  money  to  exert  a  strong  and
grossly  disproportionate  effect  on  public  policy  in  California.59 The  irony  is  that
corporations  and  business  groups  opposed  direct  democracy  in  1911  – but  once  it
passed, they learned how to exploit it for their own ends, while progressives are left
wondering if it is even possible to reform the system without betraying its democratic
original intent.
23 Once  upon  a  time  in  California,  corporations  bribed  legislators  in  order  to  obtain
desired legislation; now they can skip the middleman and go directly to the voters. A
substantial  investment  in  gathering  signatures  and  buying  airtime  can  usually
persuade – or deceive – enough voters into going along with whatever legislation those
who foot the bill want passed. The point is not that money controls direct democracy,
because it does not: spending millions on a proposition is no guarantee of success. It
does, however, cost over two million dollars just to gather enough signatures within
the allotted time in order to place a proposition on the ballot in the first place. Anyone
without that kind of cash is priced out of direct democracy, while anyone with that
much cash  lying  around can force  a  vote  on anything –  and spend any  amount  of
money to  get  it  passed.  Rather  than purge the influence of  organized wealth from
California  politics,  direct  democracy  seems  instead  to  have  rendered  it  more
sophisticated,  more respectable,  more insidious,  and perfectly legal.  Sadly,  if  Hiram
Johnson were alive today to see what has become of his beloved direct democracy, it
would probably kill him.
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ABSTRACTS
Direct  democracy,  for  better  or  for  worse,  has  become  California's  most  distinctive  and
emblematic political institution. Initiative, referendum, and recall elections were added to the
state constitution in 1911 as part of Governor Hiram Johnson's “progressive” movement, which
redeemed  the  state  from  control  by  “The  Octopus”,  meaning  the  Southern  Pacific  Railroad
monopoly that  had  a  stranglehold  on  the  state's  economy  and  government. Progressive
reformers expected that California voters would use direct democracy to tame the Octopus and
to protect themselves against such wealthy special interests in the future. Over time, however,
those same interests proved adept at using direct democracy to serve their own interests. This
article surveys the origins of direct democracy in California's progressive movement and traces
its history up to the 1970s.
La  démocratie  directe,  pour  le  meilleur  ou  pour  le  pire,  est  devenue  l’institution  la  plus
marquante et la plus emblématique de l’État de Californie. Initiative populaire, référendum et
révocation des représentants ont été introduits dans la Constitution de l’État en 1911, dans le
cadre de la réforme « progressiste » du Gouverneur Hiram Johnson, destinée à soustraire l’État au
contrôle de « La Pieuvre », à savoir le monopole de la Compagnie des chemins de fer du Pacifique
sud  qui  avait  la  mainmise  sur  l’économie  de  l’État  et  le  gouvernement.  Les  réformateurs
progressistes pensaient que les électeurs californiens recourraient à la démocratie directe pour
« dompter » la Pieuvre et pour se protéger à l’avenir contre des groupes d’intérêt si riches. Avec
le temps, cependant, ces derniers se sont avérés très habiles à utiliser la démocratie directe pour
servir leurs propres intérêts. Cet article retrace l’histoire de la démocratie directe, depuis ses
origines – qu’elle puise dans le mouvement progressiste de Californie – jusqu’aux années 1970.
INDEX
Geographical index: États-Unis, Californie
Keywords: California political history, direct democracy, initiative, referendum, recall, Johnson
Hiram, Progressive movement, Proposition 13, United States, California, Era, 19th century (late),
20th century
Mots-clés: histoire politique, démocratie directe, référendum, Johnson Hiram, mouvement
progressiste, Proposition 13, ère progressiste
Chronological index: XIXe siècle, XXe siècle
AUTHOR
GLEN GENDZEL
Associate Professor of History
San José State University, San José, California
The People versus the Octopus: California Progressives and the Origins of Dir...
Siècles, 37 | 2013
16
